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As an alternative to the usual key generation by two-way communication in schemes for
quantum cryptography, we consider codes for key generation by one-way communication.
We study codes that could be applied to the raw key sequences that are ideally obtained
in recently proposed scenarios for quantum key distribution, which can be regarded as
communication through symmetric four-letter channels.
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1. Introduction
In a recently proposed protocol for quantum key distribution,1,2 Alice sends uncor-
related qubits through a quantum channel to Bob. Under ideal circumstances, the
channel is noiseless, and then the situation is as follows.
Alice prepares each qubit in one of four states — labeled A, B, C, and D,
respectively, and chosen at random — and Bob detects each qubit in one of four
states that are labeled correspondingly. The set-up has the peculiar feature that
Bob never obtains the letter that specifies the state prepared by Alice. Rather, he
always gets one of the other three letters, whereby the laws of quantum physics
ensure that the outcome is truly random, and each possibility occurs equally likely.
These physical laws also prevent any third party, eavesdropper Eve, from ac-
quiring information about Alice’s or Bob’s letters. Therefore, they can exploit the
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correlations between their letters to generate a private cryptographic key, which
they can then use for the secure encryption of a message.
The key generation is a crucial step. Two different procedures are described in
Refs. 1 and 2, with respective efficiencies of 13 and
2
5 key bits per letter. Both proce-
dures rely on two-way communication between Alice and Bob. By contrast, it is our
objective here to study codes for the key generation by one-way communication.
After the exchange of many qubits through the quantum channel, Alice and
Bob have random sequences of the four letters, such that corresponding letters are
never the same, while each of the twelve pairs of different letters occurs one-twelfth
of the time, with no correlations between the pairs. Alice sends a code word to
Bob by telling him, through a public channel, the positions at which the letters
appear in her sequence — such as “3rd letter, then 14th, 15th, 92nd, and 65th” for
a particular five-letter word. Bob forms the received word from his corresponding
letters, and then decodes.
The public communication does not leak any useful information to Eve. Thus, if
Alice chooses a random sequence of code words, each word being equally likely, as
she will do, Eve knows nothing about Alice’s words. She also knows nothing about
Bob’s decoded words, provided that Bob’s decoding procedure does not favor some
words at the expense of others. Accordingly, the sequence of words constitutes a
privately shared key for secure classical communication between Alice and Bob.
There is a nonzero probability that Bob’s received word is consistent with two
or more words that Alice could have sent, so that the decoding will not be com-
pletely error-free. A good, practical code must, therefore, represent a compromise
between (i) having not too many code words, (ii) an acceptable error rate, and (iii)
a reasonable efficiency. Arguably the best compromise we report in Section 8 is
code (3) of Example 1. It has 1024 words, an error rate of 0.6%, and an efficiency
of 14 key bits per letter.
As there is no fundamental reason why the key generation by one-way commu-
nication should be substantially less efficient than that by two-way communication,
one expects that more efficient codes can be found. Therefore, the work reported
here should be regarded as a first step, not as the final word on the matter.
It is worth mentioning that there is a very similar problem for the three-letter
channel of Renes’s “trine” scheme.1 Further, the standard BB84 protocol3 has a
four-letter channel with quite different properties, for which codes for one-way key
generation are not known. The same remark applies to the six-letter generalization4
of BB84. In short, there is a whole class of coding problems that deserve attention.
2. Probability Distributions
The quantum protocols of Alice and Bob involve two random variables X and
Y taking values in {A,B,C,D}. We have the following corresponding probability
distributions with x, y ∈ {A,B,C,D}. The joint probability distribution of X and
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Y is given by
Pr{X = x, Y = y} =


0 if y = x ,
1
12
if y 6= x .
(1)
Accordingly, the marginal probability distributions of X and Y are
Pr{X = x} =
1
4
, Pr{Y = y} =
1
4
, (2)
and the conditional probability distribution of Y with respect to X is
Pr{Y = y | X = x} =


0 if y = x ,
1
3
if y 6= x .
(3)
Now we compute the information-theoretic quantities entropy, conditional en-
tropy, and mutual informationa of the random variables X and Y . The entropy of
Y is
H(Y ) = −
∑
y∈{A,B,C,D}
Pr{Y = y} log2 Pr{Y = y} = 2 , (4)
and for the conditional entropy of Y with respect to X we find
H(Y |X) = −
∑
x, y ∈ {A,B,C,D}
y 6= x
Pr{X = x, Y = y} log2 Pr{Y = y|X = x} = log2 3 , (5)
and we obtain
I(X ;Y ) =
∑
x, y ∈ {A,B,C,D}
y 6= x
Pr{X = x, Y = y} log2
Pr{X = x, Y = y}
Pr{X = x}Pr{Y = y}
= H(Y )−H(Y |X) = log2
4
3
(6)
for the mutual information of X and Y .
3. Discrete Memoryless Channel
The information transmission from Alice to Bob can be described in information
theory by a discrete memoryless channel.a This channel is characterized by the
conditional probability distributiona of Y with respect to X ,
Q(y|x) = Pr{Y = y | X = x} =


0 if y = x ,
1
3
if y 6= x ,
(7)
aFor the definitions of these and other information-theoretic quantities see Ref. 5, for example.
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where x, y ∈ {A,B,C,D}. The channel capacitya is defined by
c = max
PX
I(X ;Y ) = max
P
I(P ;Q) , (8)
where
I(P ;Q) =
∑
x,y
P (x)Q(y|x) log2
Q(y|x)∑
x′ P (x
′)Q(y|x′)
(9)
and the maximum is taken over all probability distributions P on {A,B,C,D}.
The channel defined by (7) is a symmetric channel (see Theorem 8.2.1 on
p. 190 in Ref. 5). Hence, the capacity is attained by the uniform distribution on
{A,B,C,D}, so that
c = log2
4
3
.
= 0.4150 . (10)
For any positive integer n, the nth extension of this discrete memoryless channel
has the conditional probability distribution
Qn(y|x) =


0 if yi = xi for some i,
1
3n
if yi 6= xi for all i,
(11)
where x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn), y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn) ∈ {A,B,C,D}n are n-letter words.
4. Codes for the Specific Channel
In this section, we discuss the design of codes and decoding methods for the specific
channel introduced in Section 3.
Let F4 be the finite field with four elements. It is convenient to let A, B, C, D
be represented respectively by the four elements 0, 1, a, b of F4 since we want to
use linear codes for this specific channel. The addition and multiplication tables of
F4 are as follows:
+ 0 1 a b
0 0 1 a b
1 1 0 b a
a a b 0 1
b b a 1 0
× 0 1 a b
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 a b
a 0 a b 1
b 0 b 1 a
(12)
Let Fn4 be the n-dimensional vector space over F4. For two vectors x =
(x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ F
n
4 , y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn) ∈ F
n
4 , the Hamming distance d(x,y)
between x and y is defined as the number of coordinates in which they differ,
d(x,y) =
∣∣{i : xi 6= yi}∣∣ . (13)
The Hamming weight w(x) is the number of nonzero coordinates in x,
w(x) =
∣∣{i : xi 6= 0}∣∣ . (14)
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A code of length n with M ≥ 2 codewords is a subset C of Fn4 ,
C = {c1, c2, . . . , cM} , ci ∈ F
n
4 . (15)
The minimum distance d(C) of the code C is the minimum Hamming distance
between two distinct codewords,
d(C) = min{d(x,y) : x,y ∈ C, x 6= y} . (16)
We denote by
L(ci) = {x ∈ F
n
4 : d(x, ci) = n} for i = 1, 2, . . . ,M (17)
the set of n-letter words that could be received if codeword ci is sent. It is easy to
see that for any i, j, l ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M} we have∣∣L(ci)∣∣ = 3n , (18)∣∣L(ci) ∩ L(cj)∣∣ ≥ 2n , (19)∣∣L(ci) ∩ L(cj) ∩ L(cl)∣∣ ≥ 1 . (20)
Note, in particular, the significance of (20): For any three different codewords that
could have been sent by Alice, there is at least one word received by Bob that is
consistent with all three.
Further, it follows from (11) that
Qn(y|x) =


0 if y 6∈ L(x) ,
1
3n
if y ∈ L(x) .
(21)
This means that if Alice sends x ∈ Fn4 through this channel to Bob, then Bob
receives y ∈ L(x) with probability 1/3n.
Now we describe a decoding method for the code C by decoding regions, which
exploits the significance of L(ci). The M subsets D1, D2, . . . , DM of F
n
4 are called
decoding regions for the code C if they satisfy the following conditions:
(i) Di ⊆ L(ci) , i = 1, 2, . . . ,M ;
(ii) Di ∩Dj = ∅ , i 6= j ;
(iii)
M⋃
i=1
Di =
M⋃
i=1
L(ci) .
(22)
The decoding method for the code C with the decoding regions D1, D2, . . . , DM is
then: decode the received vector y into ci if y ∈ Di. In some cases, for simplicity,
we can construct the decoding regions in accordance with
D1 = L(c1) ,
D2 = L(c2) \ L(c1) ,
Di = L(ci) \

i−1⋃
j=1
L(cj)

 , i = 2, 3, . . . ,M . (23)
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This means that we decode the received vector y ∈
⋃M
i=1 L(ci) into the first ci such
that d(y, ci) = n.
Since the decoding regions of (23) refer to an agreed-upon order of the code-
words, the decoding is biased toward the early codewords in the list at the expense
of the later ones. Such a bias is avoided by the maximum likelihood decoding.6 It
can be described as follows: The received vector y ∈
⋃M
i=1 L(ci) is decoded into any
codeword ci such that Q
n(y|ci) is the maximum value of Qn(y|c) over all code-
words c ∈ C. If there is more than one such ci, we choose one of them at random. It
is easy to see that this is equivalent to the following decoding method: The received
vector y is decoded into either one of the codewords ci that obey d(y, ci) = n,
choosing one at random if there are several such cis.
5. Decoding Error Probability
In this section, we discuss the decoding error probability and Shannon’s Channel
Coding Theorem for the specific channel introduced in Section 3. Some criteria for
good codes for this channel are given.
For a code C with decoding regions D1, D2, . . . , DM , the probability ei of the
event that the vector y received by Bob is not decoded into the codeword ci sent
by Alice is given by
ei = Pr{y 6∈ Di | ci is sent} = 1− Pr{y ∈ Di | ci is sent}
= 1−
|Di|
3n
, i = 1, 2, . . . ,M . (24)
The average error probability e¯ is the arithmetic mean of the eis,
e¯ =
1
M
M∑
i=1
ei = 1−
1
3nM
M∑
i=1
|Di|
= 1−
1
3nM
∣∣∣∣∣
M⋃
i=1
Di
∣∣∣∣∣
= 1−
1
3nM
∣∣∣∣∣
M⋃
i=1
L(ci)
∣∣∣∣∣ , (25)
and the maximum error probability emax is the largest one of them,
emax = max
1≤i≤M
ei. (26)
Obviously, e¯ ≤ emax. Note that
e¯ = 0⇐⇒ emax = 0
⇐⇒ ei = 0 for all i
⇐⇒ L(ci) ∩ L(cj) = ∅ , i 6= j . (27)
Hence, it follows from (19) that
emax ≥ e¯ > 0 . (28)
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In particular, if the decoding regions D1, D2, . . . , DM are given by (23), then
e1 = 1−
1
3n
∣∣L(c1)∣∣ = 0 ,
ei = 1−
1
3n
∣∣∣L(ci) \
(⋃i−1
j=1 L(cj)
)∣∣∣
=
1
3n
[∣∣L(ci)∣∣−
∣∣∣L(ci) \
(⋃i−1
j=1 L(cj)
)∣∣∣
]
=
1
3n
∣∣∣L(ci) ∩
(⋃i−1
j=1 L(cj)
)∣∣∣
=
1
3n
∣∣∣⋃i−1j=1
(
L(ci) ∩ L(cj)
)∣∣∣ , i = 2, 3, . . . ,M . (29)
The decoding error probability of a code is one of its most important per-
formance characteristics. In this connection, we recall Shannon’s Channel Coding
Theorem (see Refs. 5 and 6).
Theorem 1: (Shannon’s Channel Coding Theorem) For any 0 < ε < 1 and
0 < R < log2(4/3), there exists for sufficiently large n a code C of length n and size
M
.
= 2nR such that emax ≤ ε, and so in particular e¯ ≤ ε.
Remark 1: For fixed n and M , the best we can do is to choose a code
C = {c1, c2, . . . , cM} , ci ∈ F
n
4 , (30)
such that
∣∣⋃M
i=1 L(ci)
∣∣ is as large as possible, i.e., the average error probability e¯ is
as small as possible. For fixed n and e¯ ≤ ε, in view of (25) we have to try to find a
code C with the largest size M such that
1
M
∣∣∣∣∣
M⋃
i=1
L(ci)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 3n(1 − ε) . (31)
Note that for certain values of n and ε, such a code C may not exist.
6. Upper Bounds on the Decoding Error Probability
In this section, we give several upper bounds on the decoding error probability of
codes for our specific channel.
Let C be a code for our specific channel. The distance distribution of the code
C is defined by
As =
1
M
∣∣{(x,y) ∈ C × C : d(x,y) = s}∣∣ , s = 0, 1, . . . , n . (32)
It is easy to see that
A0 = 1 ,
n∑
s=0
As = |C| =M . (33)
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Theorem 2: Let C be a code for the specific channel in Section 3. Suppose that
the distance distribution of the code C is given by A0, A1, . . . , An. Then the average
error probability e¯ is upper bounded by
e¯ ≤
1
2
n∑
s=1
As
(
2
3
)s
. (34)
Proof: By the definition of L(ci) in (17) we know that if d(ci, cj) = s, then
∣∣L(ci) ∩ L(cj)∣∣ = 3n−s2s = 3n
(
2
3
)s
, s = 1, 2, . . . , n . (35)
Hence,
∑
1≤i<j≤M
∣∣L(ci) ∩ L(cj)∣∣ = 3nM
2
n∑
s=1
As
(
2
3
)s
. (36)
By (36) and noting that |L(ci)| = 3n, we obtain∣∣∣∣∣
M⋃
i=1
L(ci)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥
M∑
i=1
|L(ci)| −
∑
1≤i<j≤M
∣∣L(ci) ∩ L(cj)∣∣
= 3nM −
3nM
2
n∑
s=1
As
(
2
3
)s
. (37)
Hence, (34) follows from (25) and (37).
Theorem 3: Let C be a code for the specific channel in Section 3. If the minimum
distance d(C) ≥ d, then the average error probability e¯ is upper bounded by
e¯ ≤
M − 1
2
(
2
3
)d
<
M
2
(
2
3
)d
. (38)
Proof: If the minimum distance d(C) ≥ d, then As = 0 for 1 ≤ s ≤ d − 1. Hence,
by Theorem 2 and (33),
e¯ ≤
1
2
(
2
3
)d n∑
s=d
As =
M − 1
2
(
2
3
)d
<
M
2
(
2
3
)d
. (39)
This completes the proof.
Theorem 4: Let C be a code for the specific channel in Section 3. If the minimum
distance d(C) ≥ d and the decoding regions D1, D2, . . . , DM are given by (23), then
the maximum error probability emax is upper bounded by
emax ≤ (M − 1)
(
2
3
)d
< M
(
2
3
)d
. (40)
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Proof: If the minimum distance d(C) ≥ d, then for i 6= j,
∣∣L(ci) ∩ L(cj)∣∣ = 3n−d(ci,cj)2d(ci,cj) = 3n
(
2
3
)d(ci,cj)
≤ 3n
(
2
3
)d
. (41)
It follows from (41) that for i = 2, 3, . . . ,M ,∣∣∣∣∣∣
i−1⋃
j=1
(
L(ci) ∩ L(cj)
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
i−1∑
j=1
∣∣L(ci) ∩ L(cj)∣∣ ≤ (i − 1)3n
(
2
3
)d
≤ (M − 1)3n
(
2
3
)d
. (42)
Hence, by (29) and (42),
e1 = 0 , ei ≤ (M − 1)
(
2
3
)d
, i = 2, 3, . . . ,M . (43)
Therefore, emax ≤ (M − 1)(2/3)d.
7. Linear Codes
In this section, we discuss the design of linear codes and the decoding error prob-
ability of linear codes for our specific channel. Some criteria for good linear codes
are given.
First, we recall some basic concepts for linear codes. A code C over F4 is called
a linear [n, k] code over F4 if C is a k-dimensional subspace of Fn4 . Note that for
a linear [n, k] code C over F4 the number of codewords is M = 4k. Furthermore,
we call the linear code C a linear [n, k, d] code if the minimum distance of C is
at least d. Let Ai be the number of codewords in C of Hamming weight i. The
sequence of numbers A0, A1, . . . , An is called the weight distribution of C. It is well
known in coding theory7 that for a linear code C, the distance distribution of C is
equal to the weight distribution of C and the minimum distance of C is equal to the
minimum Hamming weight of nonzero codewords. For fixed n and k, let d4(n, k)
be the maximal minimum distance of a linear [n, k] code over F4. Tables of lower
and upper bounds on d4(n, k) are available in Ref. 8.
We denote by
A = {x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ F
n
4 : xi 6= 0 for all i}
= {x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ F
n
4 : w(x) = n} (44)
the set of vectors with maximal Hamming weight, that is: the set of words that do
not have the letter A. For a linear [n, k] code C over F4, by (17), it is easy to check
that ⋃
c∈C
L(c) = A+ C . (45)
10 B.-G. Englert, F.-W. Fu, H. Niederreiter, and C. Xing
Hence, by (25), the average error probability e¯ can be rewritten as
e¯ = 1−
1
3n4k
|A+ C| . (46)
Note that A+ C is a union of some cosets of C,
A+ C =
α⋃
j=1
(aj + C) , aj ∈ A , (47)
where a1 + C, a2 + C, . . . , aα + C are some different cosets of C. This implies that
|A+ C| = α4k. Therefore, the average error probability e¯ is also given by
e¯ = 1−
α
3n
. (48)
Remark 2: For fixed n and k, the best we can do is to choose a linear [n, k] code
C over F4 such that α is as large as possible. Note that even if C is optimal in this
sense, the average error probability may not be small. For fixed n and e¯ ≤ ε, we
have to try to find a linear [n, k] code C over F4 with the largest dimension k such
that
α ≥ 3n(1− ε) . (49)
Note that for certain values of n and ε, such a linear code C may not exist.
Remark 3: It is known from Ref. 9 (see Problem 11 on p. 114) that for our specific
channel the codes in Shannon’s Channel Coding Theorem can be replaced by linear
codes over F4, that is, for any 0 < ε < 1 and
k
n
<
1
2
log2(4/3)
.
= 0.2075 (50)
there will exist, for sufficiently large n, a linear [n, k] code C over F4 such that
α ≥ 3n(1− ε) . (51)
This is equivalent to the fact that e¯ ≤ ε.
In general, for a linear [n, k, d] code C over F4, by Theorem 3 we have
e¯ ≤
4k − 1
2
(
2
3
)d
<
4k
2
(
2
3
)d
, (52)
and if the decoding regions D1, D2, . . . , D4k are given by (23), then by Theorem 4,
emax ≤ (4
k − 1)
(
2
3
)d
< 4k
(
2
3
)d
. (53)
Furthermore, if the weight distribution {As}ns=0 of C is known, then by Theorem 2,
e¯ ≤
1
2
n∑
s=1
As
(
2
3
)s
. (54)
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By using the Gilbert-Varshamov quasi-random construction of linear codes,7
one can construct, for sufficiently large n, a linear [n, k] code C over F4 with size
M = 4k
.
= 4n[1−H4(d/n)] (55)
such that the minimum distance d(C) ≥ d, where
H4(x) = x log4 3− x log4 x− (1 − x) log4(1− x) , 0 ≤ x ≤
3
4
. (56)
It follows from (53) that the maximum error probability emax is upper bounded by
emax < 4
k
(
2
3
)d
.
= 4n[1−H4(d/n)+(d/n) log4(2/3)] . (57)
The function of d/n in the exponent is such that
1−H4(x) + x log4
2
3
< 0⇐⇒ x > β , (58)
where β
.
= 0.4627 is the unique solution of 1−H4(x)+x log4(2/3) = 0. This means
that, for sufficiently large n, one can construct a linear [n, k] code C over F4 with
the rate
k
n
.
= 1−H4(β)
.
= 0.1353 (59)
such that the maximum error probability emax is arbitrarily small.
8. Some Examples
In this section we give some examples of linear codes for the specific channel in
Section 3 to illustrate our results. These linear codes are listed in Brouwer’s tables8
of presently best known quaternary linear codes. The value of R is obtained from
M = 2nR in Theorem 1 and corresponds to the efficiency mentioned in Section 1.
In Table 1 we give the parameters of various codes from Ref. 8. They illustrate
a general observation, namely that there is a trade-off between the simplicity of the
code (short length n of the words, small number M of them) on one side and the
performance of the code (large efficiency R, small average error e¯). In addition to
the codes of Table 1, we mention the following four codes of moderate length and
reasonably good performance.
Example 1: Here we list explicitly known linear codes of moderate lengths.
(1) A code with n = 28 , k = 4 , d = 20 ,M = 256 for which R = 27
.
= 0.2857 and
e¯ < 4
4
2 (2/3)
20 .= 0.03849 is the upper bound of (52).
As is known from Ref. 8, there exists a linear [28, 4, 20] code over F4 with the
weight distribution A20 = 189 , A24 = 63 , A28 = 3, so that (54) gives the
bound e¯ ≤ 0.03038.
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Table 1. Examples of linear codes for the channel specified by the conditional probability distri-
bution (7). For each code we give the number n of letters in each codeword, the dimension k of
the subspace of Fn
4
, the minimum Hamming distance d, the total number M of codewords, the
efficiency R, and in the last column an upper bound of (52) on the average error probability e¯,
rounded to four significant digits.
The first group on the left are six codes of length n = 100 with consecutive values of the dimen-
sion k. For k ≥ 16, the upper bound on e¯ is greater than 1, and so it is not meaningful. The second
group on the left are two codes of large lengths which demonstrate that the error probability can
be made very small. The group on the right are 14 codes with lengths decreasing from 50 to 10.
n k d M R e¯ ≤ n k d M R e¯ ≤
100 10 62 410 0.2 6.337× 10−6 50 5 35 1024 0.2 3.516 × 10−4
100 11 60 411 0.22 5.704× 10−5 50 6 33 4096 0.24 3.165 × 10−3
100 12 58 412 0.24 5.133× 10−4 48 6 32 4096 0.25 4.747 × 10−3
100 13 56 413 0.26 4.620× 10−3 48 5 33 1024 0.208 7.912 × 10−4
100 14 55 414 0.28 0.02772 47 6 31 4096 0.255 7.120 × 10−3
100 15 52 415 0.30 0.3742 46 5 32 1024 0.217 1.187 × 10−3
45 5 31 1024 0.222 1.780 × 10−3
43 5 30 1024 0.233 2.670 × 10−3
42 5 29 1024 0.238 4.005 × 10−3
200 20 109 420 0.2 3.517× 10−8 41 5 28 1024 0.244 6.008 × 10−3
250 25 136 425 0.2 6.340× 10−10 40 4 28 256 0.2 1.502 × 10−3
30 3 22 64 0.2 4.277 × 10−3
20 2 16 16 0.2 0.01218
10 1 10 4 0.2 0.02601
(2) A code with n = 31 , k = 4 , d = 22 , M = 256 for which R = 831
.
= 0.2581 and
e¯ < 4
4
2 (2/3)
22 .= 0.01711 is the upper bound of (52).
As is known from Ref. 8, there exists a linear [31, 4, 22] code over F4 with the
weight distribution A22 = 141 , A24 = 87 , A28 = 24 , A30 = 3, so that (54)
gives the bound e¯ ≤ 0.01216.
(3) A code with n = 40 , k = 5 , d = 28 , M = 1024 for which R = 14 = 0.25 and
e¯ < 4
5
2 (2/3)
28 .= 0.006008 is the upper bound of (52).
As is known from Ref. 8, this optimal linear code is a quasi-cyclic code. The
generator matrix can be represented as G = [G0, G1, G2, G3, G4, G5, G6, G7]
where Gi for 0 ≤ i ≤ 7 are 5× 5 circulant matrices. The first row of G is given
by [10000 10120 11020 11230 12220 13130 13210 11312] , where we
identify 2 with a ∈ F4 and 3 with b ∈ F4.
(4) The shortened code of the previous example: n = 39 , k = 4 , d = 28 , M = 256
for which R = 839
.
= 0.2051 and e¯ < 4
4
2 (2/3)
28 .= 0.001502.
Remark 4: For codes of small size, one can calculate the exact values of ei, e¯, and
emax by using (24)–(29). The decoding method is also computationally feasible.
For codes of large size, for example M = 420, decoding will become an enormous
computational task.
Remark 5: By using nonlinear codes, it may be possible to achieve better re-
sults on the decoding error probability, but we have not tried to search for good
Codes for Key Generation in Quantum Cryptography 13
quaternary nonlinear codes in the literature.
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